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Abstract. The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: 
no definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular 
thing should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded 
Western philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in 
the sense that it be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature 
of contemporary orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature’s response to the probing 
action of an observer is determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason 
at all. This appeal to pure chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-
based Western science. It is argued here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum 
physics, that in a world that conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum 
statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic level, in cases where the reason behind 
Nature’s choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics can become biased in an 
empirically manifest and apparently retrocausal way when the reason for the choice is empirically 
identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to be biased in a 
certain plausible way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by 
orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearance of backward-time-causation of the 
kind that have been reported in the scientific literature.   
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INTRODUCTION 
An article recently published by the Cornell psychologist Daryl J. Bem [1] in a 
distinguished psychology journal has provoked a heated discussion in the New York 
Times [2]. Among the discussants was Douglas Hofstadter who wrote that: “If any of his 
claims were true, then all of the bases underlying contemporary science would be 
toppled, and we would have to rethink everything about the nature of the universe.”   
It is, I believe, an exaggeration to say that if any of Bem’s claims were true then “all of 
the bases underlying contemporary science would be toppled” and that “we would have 
to rethink everything about the nature of the universe”. In fact, all that is required is a 
relatively small change in the rules, and one that seems reasonable and natural in its own 
right.  The major part of the required rethinking was done already by the founders of 
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quantum mechanics, and cast in more rigorous form by John von Neumann [3], more 
than seventy years ago. 
According to the precepts of classical mechanics, once the physically described 
universe is created, it evolves in a deterministic manner that is completely fixed by 
mathematical laws that depend only on the present values of evolving physically 
described properties. There are no inputs to the dynamics that go beyond what is 
specified by those physically described properties. [Here physically described properties 
are properties that are specified by assigning mathematical properties to space-time 
points, or to very tiny regions.] The increasing knowledge of human beings and other 
biological agents enters only as an output of the physically described evolution of the 
universe, and even nature itself is not allowed to interfere with the algorithmically 
determined mechanistic evolution.  
This one-way causation from the physical aspects of nature to the 
empirical/epistemological/mental aspects has always been puzzling: Why should 
“knowledge” exist at all if it cannot influence anything physical, and hence be of no use 
to the organisms that possess it. And how can something like an “idea”, seemingly so 
different from physical matter, as matter is conceived of in classical mechanics, be 
created by, or simply be, the motion of physical matter? 
The basic precepts of classical mechanics are now known to be fundamentally 
incorrect: they cannot be reconciled with a plenitude of empirical facts discovered and 
verified during the twentieth century. Thus there is no reason to demand, or believe, that 
those puzzling properties of the classically conceived world must carry over to the actual 
world, which conforms far better to the radically different precepts of quantum 
mechanics.  
The founders of quantum theory conceived the theory to be a mathematical procedure 
for making practical predictions about future empirical-experiential findings on the basis 
of our present knowledge. According to this idea, quantum theory is basically about the 
evolution of knowledge. This profound shift is proclaimed by Heisenberg’s assertion [4] 
that the quantum mathematics “represents no longer the behavior of the elementary 
particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior”, and by Bohr’s statement [5] that 
“Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics merely offers 
rules of calculation for the deduction of expectation about observations obtained under 
conditions defined by classical physics concepts.” 
The essential need to bring “observations” into the theoretical structure arises from the 
fact that evolution via the Schrödinger equation, which is the quantum analog of the 
classical equations of motion, produces in general not a single evolving physical world 
that is compatible with human experience and observations, but rather a mathematical 
structure that corresponds to a smeared out mixture of increasingly many such worlds. 
Consequently, some additional process, beyond the one generated by Schrödinger 
equation, is needed to specify what the connection is between the physically described 
quantum state of the universe and empirical/experiential reality. Epistemological factors 
must thereby become connected to the mathematically described physical aspects of the 
quantum mechanical description of nature. 
The founders of quantum mechanics achieved an important advance in our 
understanding of nature when they recognized that the mathematically/physically 
described universe that appears in our best physical theory represents not the world of 
  
3 
material substance contemplated in the classical physics of Isaac Newton and his direct 
successors, but rather a world of “potentia”, or “weighted possibilities”, for our future 
acquisitions of knowledge [6]. It is not surprising that a scientific theory designed to 
allow us to predict correlations between our shared empirical findings should incorporate, 
as orthodox quantum mechanics does: 1), a natural place for “our knowledge”, which is 
both all that is really known to us, and also the empirical foundation upon which science 
is based; 2), an account of the process by means of which we acquire our knowledge of  
certain physically described aspects of nature; and 3), a statistical description, at the 
pragmatic level, of relationships between various features of the growing aspect of nature 
that constitutes “our knowledge”. What is perhaps surprising is the ready acceptance by 
most western-oriented scientists and philosophers of the notion that the element of chance 
that enters quite reasonably into the pragmatic formulation of physical theory, in a 
practical context where many pertinent things may be unknown to us, stems from an 
occurrence of raw pure chance at the underlying ontological level.  Ascribing such 
capriciousness to nature herself would seem to contradict the rationalist ideals of Western 
Science. From a strictly rational point of view, it not unreasonable to examine the 
mathematical impact of accepting, at the basic ontological level, Einstein’s dictum that: 
“God does not play dice with the universe”, and to attribute the effective entry of pure 
chance at the pragmatic level to our lack of knowledge of the reasons for the “choices on 
the part of nature” to be what they turn out to be.   
These “random” quantum choices are key elements of orthodox quantum mechanics, 
and the origin of these choices is therefore a fundamental issue. Are they really purely 
random, as contemporary orthodox theory asserts? Or could they stem at the basic 
ontological level from sufficient reasons? 
     IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 
I make no judgment on the significance of the purported evidence for the existence of 
various retrocausal phenomena. That I leave to the collective eventual wisdom of the 
scientific community. I am concerned here rather with essentially logical and 
mathematical issues, as they relate to the apparent view of some commentators that 
scholarly articles reporting the existence of retrocausal phenomena should be banned 
from the scientific literature, essentially for the reason articulated in the New York Times 
by Douglas Hofstadter, namely that the actual existence of such phenomena is 
irreconcilable with what we now (think we) know about the structure of the universe; that 
the actual existence of such phenomena would require a wholesale abandonment of basic 
ideas of contemporary physics. That assessment is certainly not valid, as will be shown 
here. Only a limited, and intrinsically reasonable, modification of the existing orthodox 
quantum mechanics is needed in order to accommodate the reported data. 
In order for science to be able to confront effectively purported phenomena that violate 
the prevailing basic theory what is needed is an alternative theory that retains the valid 
predictions of the currently prevailing theory, yet accommodates in a rationally coherent 
way the purported new phenomena. 
If the example of the transition from classical physics to quantum physics can serve as 
an illustration, in that case we had a beautiful theory that had worked well for 200 years, 
but that was incompatible with the new data made available by advances in technology. 
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However, a new theory was devised that was closely connected to the old one, and that 
allowed us to recapture the old results in the appropriate special cases, where the effects 
of the nonzero value of Planck’s constant could be ignored. The old formalism was by-
and-large retained, but readjusted to accommodate the fact that pq-qp was non-zero. Yet 
there was also a rejection of a basic classical presupposition, namely the idea that a 
physical theory should properly be exclusively about connections between physically 
described material events. The founders of quantum theory insisted that their physical 
theory was a pragmatic theory -- i.e., was directed at predicting practically useful 
connections between empirical (i.e., experienced) events [7].  
This original pragmatic Copenhagen QM was not suited to be an ontological theory, 
because of the movable boundary between the aspects of nature described in classical 
physical terms and those described in quantum physical terms. It is certainly not 
ontologically realistic to believe that the pointers on observed measuring devices are built 
out of classically conceivable electrons and atoms, etc. The measuring devices, and also 
the bodies and brains of human observers, must be understood to be built out of quantum 
mechanically described particles. That is what allows us to understand and describe many 
observed properties of these physically described systems, such as their rigidity and 
electrical conductance.  
Von Neumann’s analysis of the measurement problem allowed the quantum state of 
the universe to describe the entire physically described universe: everything that we 
naturally conceive to be built out of atomic constituents and the fields that they generate. 
This quantum state is described by assigning mathematical properties to spacetime points 
(or tiny regions). We have a deterministic law, the Schrödinger equation, that specifies 
the mindless, essentially mechanical, evolution of this quantum state. But this quantum 
mechanical law of motion generates a huge continuous smear of worlds of the kind that 
we actually experience. For example, as Einstein emphasized, the position of the pointer 
on a device that is supposed to tell us the time of the detection of a particle produced by 
the decay of a radioactive nucleus, evolves, under the control of the Schrödinger 
equation, into a continuous smear of positions corresponding to all the different possible 
times of detection; not to a single position, which is what we observe [8]. And the 
unrestricted validity of the Schrödinger equation would lead, as also emphasized by 
Einstein, to the conclusion that the moon, as it is represented in the theory, would be 
smeared out over the entire night sky, until the first observer of it, say a mouse, looked.  
How do we understand this huge disparity between the representation of the universe 
evolving in accordance with the Schrödinger equation and the empirical reality that we 
experience?  
A completely satisfactory physical theory must include a logically coherent 
explanation of how the mathematical/physical description is connected to the experienced 
empirical realities. This demands, in the final analysis, a theory of the mind-brain 
connection: a theory of how our idea-like knowing aspects are connected to our evolving 
physically described brains. 
The micro-macro separation that enters into Copenhagen QM is actually a separation 
between what is described in quantum mechanical physical terms and what is described 
in terms of our experiences -- expressed in terms of our everyday concepts of the 
physical world, refined by the concepts of classical physics. ([9], Sec. 3.5.) 
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To pass from quantum pragmatism to quantum ontology one can treat all physically 
described aspects quantum mechanically, as Von Neumann did. He effectively 
transformed the Copenhagen pragmatic version of QM into a potentially ontological 
version by shifting the brains and bodies of the observers -- and all other physically 
described aspects of the theory -- into the part described in quantum mechanical 
language. The entire physically described universe is treated quantum mechanically, and 
our knowledge, and the process by means of which we acquire our knowledge about the 
physically described world, were elevated to essential features of the theory, not merely 
postponed, or ignored! Thus certain aspects of reality that had been treated superficially 
in the earlier classical theories -- namely “our knowledge” and “the process by means of 
which we acquire our knowledge” -- were now incorporated into the theory in a detailed 
way.  
Specifically, each acquisition of knowledge was postulated to involve, first, an 
initiating probing action executed by an “observer”, followed by “a choice on the part of 
nature” of a response to the agent’s request (demand) for this particular piece of 
experientially specified information. 
This response on the part of nature is asserted by orthodox quantum mechanics to be 
controlled by random chance, by a throw of nature’s dice, with the associated 
probabilities specified purely in terms of physically described properties. These 
“random” responses create a sequence of collapses of the quantum state of the universe, 
with the universe created at each stage concordant with the new state of “our 
knowledge”.  
If Nature’s choices conform strictly to these orthodox statistical rules then the 
retrocausal results reported by Bem cannot be accommodated. However, if nature is not 
capricious -- if God does not play dice with the universe -- but Nature’s choices have 
sufficient reasons, then, given the central role of “our knowledge” in quantum mechanics, 
it becomes reasonable to consider the possibility that Nature’s choices are not completely 
determined in the purely mechanical way specified by the orthodox rules, but can be 
biased away from the orthodox rules in ways that depend upon the character of the 
knowledge/experiences that these choices are creating. The results reported by Bem can 
then be explained in simple way, and nature is elevated from a basically physical process 
to a basically psycho-physical process. 
The question is then: What sort of biasing will suffice? One possibly adequate answer 
is a biasing that favors positive experiences and disfavors negative experiences, where 
positive and negative refers to the “feel” of the experience: pleasing or displeasing. 
In classical statistical physics such a biasing of the statistics would not produce the 
appearance of retrocausation. But in quantum mechanics it does! The way that the 
biasing of the forward-in-time quantum causal structure leads to seemingly “retrocausal” 
effects will now be explained. 
BACKWARD IN TIME EFFECTS IN QUANTUM MECHANICS 
The idea that choices made now can influence what has already happened needs to be 
clarified, for this idea is, in some basic sense, incompatible with our idea of the meaning 
of time. Yet the empirical results of Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiments [10], and the 
more elaborate delayed-choice experiments of Scully and colleagues [11] are saying that, 
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in some sense, what we choose to investigate now can influence what happened in the 
past. This backward-in-time aspect of QM is neatly captured by an assertion made in the 
recent book "The Grand Design" by Hawking and Mlodinow: "We create history by our 
observations, history does not create us" [12]. 
 
How can one make rationally coherent sense out of this strange feature of QM?  
 
I believe that the most satisfactory way is to introduce the concept of "process time". 
This is a "time" that is different from the "Einstein time" of classical deterministic 
physics. That classical time is the time that is joined to physically described space to give 
classical Einstein space-time. (For more details, see my chapter in "Physics and the 
Ultimate Significance of Time" SUNY, 1986, Ed. David Ray Griffiths. In this book three 
physicists, D. Bohm, I. Prigogine, and I, set forth some basic ideas pertaining to time. 
[13]) 
Orthodox quantum mechanics features the phenomena of collapses (or reductions) of 
the evolving quantum mechanical state. In orthodox Tomonaga-Schwinger relativistic 
quantum field theory [14,15,16], the quantum state collapses not on an advancing 
sequence of constant time surfaces (lying at a sequence of times t(n), with t(n+1)>t(n), as 
in nonrelativistic QM), but rather on an advancing sequence of space-like surfaces 
Sigma(n). (For each n, every point on the spacelike surface Sigma(n) is spacelike 
displaced from every other point on Sigma(n), and every point on Sigma(n+1) either 
coincides with a point on Sigma(n), or lies in the open future light-cone of some points on 
Sigma(n), but not in the open backward light-cone of any point of Sigma(n).) 
At each surface Sigma(n) a projection operator P(n), or its complement P'(n) = I-P(n), 
acts to reduce the quantum state to some part of its former self!  
For each surface Sigma(n) there is an associated "block universe", which is defined by 
extending the quantum state on Sigma(n) both forward and backward in time via the 
unitary time evolution operator generated by the Schrödinger equation. Let the index n 
that labels the surfaces Sigma(n) be called "process time". Then for each instant n of 
process time a “new history” is defined by the backward-in-time evolution from the 
newly created state on Sigma(n).  
This new “effective past” is the past that smoothly evolves into the future the quantum 
state (of the universe) that incorporates the effects of the psycho-physical event that just 
occurred. As far as current predictions about the future are concerned it is as if the past 
were the “effective past”: the former actual past is no longer pertinent because it fails to 
incorporate the effects of the psycho-physical event that just occurred.   
In orthodox QM each instant of process time corresponds to an "observation": the 
collapse at process time n reduces the former quantum state to the part of itself that is 
compatible with the increased knowledge generated by the new observation. This 
sequential creation of a sequence of new “effective pasts” is perhaps the strangest feature 
of orthodox quantum mechanics, and the origin of its other strange features. 
The actual evolving physical universe is generated by the always-forward-moving 
creative process. It is forward-moving in the sense that the sequence of surfaces Sigma(n) 
advances into the future, and at each instant n of process time some definite, never-to-be-
changed, psycho-physical events happens. But this forward-moving creative process 
generates in its wake an associated sequence of effective pasts, one for each process time 
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n. The conditions that define the effective past associated with process time n change the 
preceding effective past imposing a “final” condition that represents what happened at 
process time n. It is this “effective past” that evolves directly into the future, and is the 
past that, from a future perspective, has smoothly evolved into what exists “now”.  The 
actual past is not relevant to a history of the universe that starts from now and looks back, 
and projects smoothly into the immediate future.  
The “histories” approach to quantum physics focuses attention on histories, rather than 
the generation of the profusion of incompatible possibilities. Both the effective past and 
the history associated with process time n depend upon which experiment is performed at 
time n , and in quantum mechanics that choice of which experiment is performed at 
process time n is not determined by the quantum state at process time n: it depends upon 
the agent’s “free choice” of which probing action to initiate, where the word “free” 
specifies precisely the fact that this choice on the part of the agent is not determined by 
the known laws of nature.  
 Two key features of von Neumann’s rules are mathematical formalizations of two 
basic features of the earlier pragmatic Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr, Heisenberg, 
Pauli, and Dirac. Associated with each observation there is an initial “choice on the part 
of the observer” of what aspect of nature will be probed. This choice is linked to an 
empirically recognizable possible outcome “Yes”, and an associated projection operator 
P(n) that, if it acts on the prior quantum state ρ, reduces that prior state to the part of itself 
compatible with the knowledge gleaned from the experiencing of the specified outcome 
“Yes”.  
The process that generates the observer’s choice of the probing action is not specified 
by contemporary quantum mechanics: this choice is, in this very specific sense, a “free 
choice on the part of the experimenter.” Once this choice of probing action is made and 
executed, then, in Dirac’s words, there is “a choice on the part of nature”: nature 
randomly selects the outcome, “Yes” or “No” in accordance with the statistical rule 
specified by quantum theory. If Nature’s choice is “Yes” then P(n) acts on the prior 
quantum state ρ, and if nature’s answer is “No” then the complementary projection 
operator P'(n) = I-P(n) acts on the prior state. Multiple-choice observations are 
accommodated by decomposing the possibility “No” into sub-possibilities “Yes” and 
“No”. 
MATHEMATICAL DETAILS 
The description of orthodox quantum mechanics given above is a didactic equation-
free account of what follows from the equations of quantum measurement theory. Some 
basic mathematical details are given in this section.  
The mathematical representation of the dynamical process of measurement is 
expressed by the two basic formulas of quantum measurement theory:  
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Here the integer “n” identifies an element in the global sequence of probing 
“measurement” actions. The symbol  ρ(n) represents the quantum state (density matrix) 
of the observed physical system (ultimately the entire physically described universe, here 
assumed closed) immediately after the nth measurement action; P(n) is the (projection) 
operator associated with answer “Yes” to the question posed by the nth measurement 
action, and P'(n) = I–P(n) is analogous projection operator associated in the same way 
with the answer “No” to that question, with “I” the unit matrix. The formulas have been 
reduced to their essences by ignoring the unitary evolution between measurements, which 
is governed by the Schrödinger equation.   
The expectation value <P(n+1)>Y  is the normal orthodox probability that nature’s 
response to the question associated with P(n+1) will be “Yes”, and hence that ρ(n+1) 
will be ρ(n+1)Y . In the second equation I have used the defining property of projection 
operators, PP=P, and the general property of the trace operator: for any X and Y, Tr(XY) 
= Tr(YX). (The trace operation Tr is defined by: Tr(M) = Sum of the diagonal elements of 
the matrix M).  
Of course, one cannot know the density matrix ρ of the entire universe. The orthodox 
rules tell us to construct a “reduced” density matrix by taking a partial trace over the 
degrees of freedom about which we are ignorant, and renormalizing. This eliminates from 
the formulas the degrees of freedom about which we are ignorant.   
The trace operation is the quantum counterpart of the classical integration over all of 
phase space. The classical operation is a summation that gives equal a priori weighting to 
equal volumes of phase space. That is the weighting that is invariant under canonical 
transformations, which express physical symmetries. The quantum counterparts of the 
canonical transformations are the unitary transformations, which leave the trace 
unchanged. Thus the orthodox trace rules are the rational way to give appropriate weights 
to properties about which have no knowledge, namely by assuming that properties related 
by physical symmetries should be assigned equal a priori weights. 
All this is just orthodox quantum mechanics, elaborated to give a rationally coherent 
ontological account compatible with the standard computational rules and predictions. 
[17].   
But the assumption that nature gives equal weights to properties that we, in our current 
state of scientific development, assume should be given equal weights, does not mean 
that nature itself must give such properties equal weight. Two states of the brain that are 
assigned equal statistical weight by the orthodox trace rule may be very different in the 
sense that one corresponds to a meaningful experience and the other fails to corresponds 
to any meaningful experience. Classical mechanics postulates that experiential qualities 
can make no difference in the flow of physical events. But, since quantum mechanics 
places experiences in a much more central role than classical mechanics, there is no 
rationally compelling reason to postulate in quantum mechanics that nature, in the 
process of choosing outcomes of empirical questions posed by agents, must be oblivious 
to the experiential aspects of reality. That issue should be settled by empirical results, not 
by classical-physics-based prejudice.  
Consider a situation in which: (1), an agent (the participant) observes a property that 
corresponds to a projection operator P; and (2), a dynamically independent random 
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number generator (RNG) creates either the property represented by the projection 
operator Q, or the property represented by the complementary property Q’=(I-Q). 
Suppose at some time after these properties have been created they are still confined to 
two different systems that have never interacted, so that PQ=QP, and ρ = ρ(P) ρ(Q). 
Then the probability of getting the answer (PYes), given that (QYes) occurs, is: 
 
Trace PQρ/TraceQρ  =Tr P ρ(P)/Tr ρ(P), 
 
which is independent of Q: the probability of P does not depend on what the dynamically 
independent RNG does. If the two systems interact later, beginning at time t, then the 
propagation to a final later time t’ of getting the outcome PYes at the earlier time t is 
obtained by the action of a unitary transformation: the quantity upon which the trace 
operation acts gets multiplied on the right by a unitary U(t’,t), and on the left by the 
Hermitian conjugate of U(t’,t). This action leaves the probability of PYes at the earier 
time t intact.   
 If there is then a final measurement at the later final time t’ of a property 
represented by a projection operator R, then there could be a dependence upon whether 
Nature’s choice at time t’ actualizes R or R’ = (I-R). But if the orthodox random rules are 
obeyed then the net effect, obtained by averaging over the two properly weighted 
possibilities, is null – because R +R’ = I : the mere fact that an observation is made at the 
final time t’ has no effect on the correlation (actually the lack of correlation) between P 
and Q observed at the earlier time t. However, if Nature’s choices are not weighted in the 
orthodox way then the contributions from the two “complementary” effective pasts, 
arising from R and R’, respectively, will be unequally weighted,  and the sum over the 
two terms might no longer wipe out the effects of the differing effective pasts that lead to 
Ryes and RNo, respectively: observable effects can arise from an excess of 
histories/probability corresponding to the option, say RYes, that Nature’s choice favored, 
and a deficit of histories/probability corresponding to the option, say RNo, that Nature’s 
choice disfavored. If Nature’s choices are not weighted in accordance with the orthodox 
rules then the different histories leading to differing final states, RYes or RNo, can get 
biased weightings in the effective past actualized by Nature’s biased choice between 
RYes and RNo.  
 
 
 
              APPLICATION TO BEM’S EXPERIMENTS 
 
 All nine of Bem’s experiments have the following general form: First, in each 
instance in a series of experimental instances, the participant is presented with some 
options, and picks a subset of these options as ‘preferred’. These preferences are duly 
recorded. Later, for each instance, an emotional stimulus is applied to the participant. The 
stimulus, and the way it is applied to the participant, is determined by some random 
number generators (RNGs). These RNGs are, according to both classical and quantum 
ideas, dynamically independent of the participant’s earlier actions. But Bem’s empirical 
result is that the probability that an option is preferred by the participant at the early time 
depends upon choices made later by the RNGs.  
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This finding seems to suggest that either the believed-to-be dynamically independent 
RGNs are being influenced in a mysterious and complex way by the participant’s earlier 
actions; or the participant’s earlier actions are being affected in a complex retrocausal 
(backward-in-time causal) way by the choices made by RNGs.  
The kinds of actions made by the participant, and by the RNGs, vary greatly over the 
nine experiments. But, from a quantum standpoint, one single presumption explains all of 
the reported results, and explains them all in a basically forward-in-time causal way, 
without any mysterious influence of the participant’s choice of preference on the RGNs. 
This presumption is that the choices on the part of nature, which are essential elements of 
orthodox quantum mechanics, are slightly biased, relative to the orthodox quantum 
stastistical rules, in favor of the actualization of positive feelings in the mind of the 
participant, and against the actualization of negative feelings. 
For example, in the first Bem experiment the participant is shown two similar screens, 
L and R, and is told that behind one screen lies a picture, and behind the other lies the 
image of a blank wall. S/he is instructed to choose a “preferred” screen, P (either L or R) 
behind which s/he feels the picture lies. After the participant’s preference P, either L or R, 
is recorded, a first random number generator, RNG1, chooses a “target” screen T (either 
L or R),  and assigns a picture to target screen T, and an image of a blank wall to the 
other screen. A second random number generator, RNG2, decides, with equal 
probabilities, whether the picture will be “Erotic” or “Neutral” (The stimulus type S is 
either E or N)). What has been determined by the RNGs to lie behind the preferred screen 
P is then shown to the participant.    
Bem’s empirical result is that the participants choose more often than orthodox 
quantum mechanics (or classical statistical mechanics) predicts the screen behind which 
will lie an erotic picture, but prefers L and R with equal probability if RNG2 chooses a 
“neutral” picture. 
If the well-tested random number generators are working as they normally do then this 
empirical result would appear to be a case of retrocausation (causal action backward in 
time): the choices made later by the two RNGs are influencing the subject’s earlier 
choice between L and R. An alternative possibility is that RGN2, which chooses between 
“erotic” and “neutral”, is being influenced by the participant’s earlier choice between L 
and R, so that the screen behind which the participant looks will tend to be erotic, but 
only if RNG1 chooses “picture” not “blank wall”. These explanations would require, as 
Hofstadter remarked, a very major revision of contemporary ideas about how nature 
works. 
These putative explanations, just described, are in terms of strange causal connections 
between the earlier choice made by the participant and the later choices made by the 
supposedly dynamically independent RNGs: the character of the participant’s final 
feelings are not considered. But Bem’s results are explained in natural, rational, and 
basically forward-causal way, without any weird behaviors of the RNGs, if Nature’s 
choice of the participant’s final experience – a choice that is an absolutely essential 
element of orthodox quantum theory, and the place where the quantum element of chance 
enters -- favors, relative to the statistical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics, the 
occurrence of positive (pleasing) experiences and disfavors the occurrence of negative 
feelings. If such a biasing of Nature’s choices were to occur, then the observed greater 
likelihood of the participant’s choosing the screen, L or R, behind which an erotic picture 
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will lie would arise from the enhanced likelihood that nature will actualize an erotic 
experience, instead of an experience of a neutral picture or a blank wall. In this 
experimental set up an erotic experience can occur only if P=T and S=E: the participant’s 
earlier choice of the between L and R must agree with the later choice of RNG1 between 
L and R, since otherwise the participant will see only a blank wall, and even if P=T, the 
choice of stimulus S must be E, since otherwise the participant will see a neutral picture. 
 A compact way of stating this explanation is to say that the quantum histories [defined 
by the sequences of choices (P,T,S,F) leading to the final experience F=+, or F=-] that 
lead to F=+ are more likely to occur than the rules of orthodox quantum mechanics 
predict. Only those histories in which the two L/R choices agree (P=T) can lead to an 
Erotic experience, because if these two choices disagree the participant will see a blank 
wall. But this enhancement will occur only in the subset of histories in which S=E.  
In Bem’s Experiment 2, “Precognitive Avoidance of (Subliminal) Negative Stimuli”, a 
sequence of similar pairs of neutral pictures is shown to the participant, who chooses a 
‘preferred’ picture from each neutral pair. After each such recorded choice of preference 
P, a RNG1 makes a random choice of one picture from the initial pair. The picture chosen 
by RNG1 is called the ‘target’ T. Then the apparatus flashes a subliminal picture, the 
stimulus S, that is positive, S=+, if T=P, but is highly negative, S=-, if the preferred 
neutral picture P is not the subsequently randomly chosen target picture T. 
The normal idea of forward causation does not allow this random choice of target, and 
the associated application of a stimulus, both of which occur after the recorded choice of 
preference, to affect, in any instance, the participant’s previously recorded choice of 
preference between two matched neutral pictures. Yet Bem’s predicted and empirically 
validated result is that the picture P preferred at an earlier time by a participant is more 
likely to be the subsequently chosen target picture T than the subsequently chosen 
nontarget, even though the choice between target and nontarget was 50-50 random, and 
was made only later. The non-targeted pictures, which are, according to Bem’s empirical 
findings, less likely to be preferred than chance predicts, are the pictures that occur in 
conjunction with the later subliminal application to the participant of highly unpleasant 
pictures. Hence they should lead to unpleasant participant feelings and should therefore, 
according to the present hypothesis, be less likely than chance predicts to be selected by 
Nature’s choice to become an actually experienced outcome: 
<(P,T not P, S-, F-)>  < <P, T=P. S+, F+>.  
This experimental protocol is quite different from the protocol of the first experiment. 
In the first experiment the stimulus that was applied later to the participant was 
independent of the participant’s earlier choice of preference, whereas in experiment 2 the 
stimulus that is applied later to the participant depends upon the earlier choice of 
preference. Moreover, the stimulus was supraliminal in the first experiment but 
subliminal in the second experiment. 
Nevertheless, the apparently retrocausal effect in the second experiment follows from 
the same quantum assumption as before, namely that Nature’s choice of which final 
experience actually occurs has a tendency to increase the likelihood of positive, and 
diminish the likelihood of negative, final experiences of the participant.  In experiment 2 
the effect of this biasing is to diminish the likelihood of instances in which the final 
feeling of the participant is negative, due to the earlier application to the participant of an 
(albeit subliminal) highly negative stimulus. 
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Bem’s experiments 3 and 4 are “Retrocausal Primings”. Unlike the first two 
experiments, they do not involve matched neutral pairs between which the participant 
must choose. Rather, each instance now involves a single picture, which is either positive 
or negative. This non-neutral picture is shown to the participant, who responds by 
pressing a first or second button according to whether s/he feels the picture to be pleasing 
or not. The time that it takes for the participant to react to the picture is recorded.  Then, a 
‘word’ is selected by a RNG, and is (supraliminally) shown to the participant. The 
previously recorded reaction time turns out to be shorter or longer according to whether 
feeling of the word is “congruent” or ‘incongruent” to the feeling of the picture 
experienced earlier.  
There is also a ‘normal’ version of the experiment in which the word chosen by the 
RNG is displayed before the participant chooses his preference. Bem’s experimental set-
up is one for which, also in the ‘normal’ version, the recorded reaction time is shorter or 
longer according to whether feeling of the word is  “congruent” or ‘incongruent” to the 
feeling of the picture shown earlier. 
The question is: How, in the retrocausal version, can the reaction time, which was 
recorded earlier, depend on which word was randomly selected later? 
This empirical finding is explained by an assumed biasing of “Nature’s choice” of the 
participant’s final feeling that favors congruency in the flow of experience over 
incongruency. Such a putative biasing of Nature’s choice has the effect of adding to the 
effective past, after nature’s biased choice, of an abnormal contribution that corresponds 
to the addition of extra histories that lead to the mentioned positive feelings, and to the 
subtraction of histories that lead to analogous negative feelings. These changes in the 
weightings of the differing histories, in accordance with the nature of the feeling induced 
by the stimulus word, have an effect on the quantum state of the participant’s brain, 
during the process of his or her choosing between positive and negative pictures. This 
effect on the brain is roughly independent of whether the stimulus was applied before or 
after the participant’s choice of response. In both cases the “effective past” state of the 
brain of the participant during his or her process of choosing a response is changed in 
essentially the same way: it is not important whether the change in the effective state of 
the participant’s brain, during the process of choosing his or her preference, comes from 
changes in the earlier or later boundary condition on that “effective past” state of the 
brain. The key point is that, as discussed in earlier sections, the “effective past” 
incorporates the conditions imposed by the occurrence of the final outcome! A “history” 
starts from what is now known, and extends backward from the known present, which 
depends on nature’s most recent choice. 
In the three habituation experiments the participant is again shown a matched pair of 
pictures, and is asked which one s/he prefers. The two matched pictures are both strongly 
negative, both strongly positive (erotic), or both essentially neutral in the first, second, 
and third experiments, respectively. (I have slightly reorganized Bem’s data in this way 
for logical clarity, and ignored some inconclusive data with small statistics in which the 
later stimuli were supraliminal.) After the participant makes a binary recorded choice of 
preference, an RNG chooses one of the two similar pictures as target, and the targeted 
picture is subliminally flashed several times. The subliminal re-exposures, made after the 
participant’s choice of preference of the targeted emotion-generating picture, have the 
effect of reducing, in the case of the positive pairs of pictures, and increasing in the case 
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of negative pairs of pictures, the fraction of instances in which the (previously) preferred 
picture was the target rather than the nontarget: the effective positivity/negativity of the 
targeted (and hence repeatedly subliminally represented) pictures was reduced. This is 
explained by a reduction in the emotional intensity of the participant’s final feeling, 
caused by the repeated re-exposure to the highly emotional pictures, and the attendant 
diminuation of the biasing of Nature’s choices.  
In the two memory experiments the participant is exposed to a sequence of 48 
common everyday nouns, and is then tested see which words s/he remembers. 
Afterwards, 24 of the original set of words are randomly chosen to be ‘targets, and then, 
in a sequence of computer-controlled actions, the participant is repeatedly re-exposed to 
each of the target words, but none of the non-target words. It is subsequently found that 
among the recalled words there are more target words than non-target words. This is 
explained if Nature’s choice of the participant’s final feelings favors the feel of congruent 
streams of conscious experiences over the feel of less congruent ones.     
 
All of Bem’s reported results are thus explained by a single presumption, namely that 
Nature’s choices, rather than being strictly random, in accordance with the rules of 
contemporary orthodox quantum mechanics, are slightly biased, relative to the 
predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics, in favor of outcomes that feel pleasing, and 
against outcomes that feel displeasing. 
This explanation is “scientific”, in the sense that it can be falsified. If the output of the 
RNGs were to be observed by an independent observer, before the RNG-chosen action is 
made on the participant, then the biasings reported by Bem should disappear, because 
Nature’s choice would then be about the possible experiences of the independent 
observer rather than about those of the participant. A more elaborate test would be to 
have two participants doing the experiment on the same sequence of picture, with 
reversed polarities. A dependence upon who first experiences the output of the RNG 
would, if it were to occur, constitute spectacular support for the notion that our 
experiences really do influence the course of physically described events, rather than 
being merely causally inert by-products of a process completely determined by purely 
physical considerations alone. 
 In the above discussion I have treated all of the RNGs as true quantum-process-based 
random number generators. In some of the experiments the RNG was actually a pseudo-
random number generator, a PRNG. In principle a PRNG is, in these experiments, just as 
good as a true RNG, unless at the time of its effective action some real observer actually 
knows everything needed to specify what the pseudo-random choice must be. Unless the 
outcome is actually specified by what is actually currently known by observing agents, 
the outcome is, within this orthodox framework, effectively undetermined. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Numerous reported seemingly backward-in-time causal effects could be naturally 
explained within a slightly modified version of orthodox forward-in-time quantum 
mechanics. In this version, Nature’s “random” choices of which outcomes to actualize are 
slightly biased in favor of actualizing positive feelings and against actualizing negative 
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feelings. In the Bem experiments the power of a participant to bias the statistics depends 
very strongly on the participant’s mental characteristics, as measured by simple 
questionnaire responses.  
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The answer is the same as before: the effective background state of the subject’s brain-
- positive or negative -- in the extra effective histories created by nature’s biased response 
to the later priming is similar to the normal forward-in-time effect of the same priming: it 
matters little whether this influential background state of the brainis produced by an 
initial or a final boundary condition on the effective past.  
 
 
To achieve this explanation one needs to relax the condition that the von Neumann 
process-1 action of posing a question identifies a property of the brain of the observing 
system that can be grasped as a high-grade conscious experience.  One might replace 
“high-grade conscious experience” by “experienced mood”, which could be generated by 
the subliminal stimuli. Or high-grade conscious experience could be replaced by a lower-
level kind of experience. One actually needs such a relaxing anyway, in order to allow 
lowly life-forms to enter into the quantum dynamics.  
The general proposal that Nature’s choices arise from reasons should be helpful also to 
the effort to understand the origin of life. If nature exhibits a slight biasing for positive 
experiences of individual human beings it would perhaps be natural for it exhibit a large 
bias in favor of the existence in the universe of systems that can represent meaning, and 
act on the basis of such reasons. What is at issue here is the basic nature of the logical 
break, in the passage to a quantum universe, with the classical-physics conception of a 
mindless, purposeless, reasonless, purely mechanical universe.  Experiments of the kind 
performed by Bem, and variations thereof, if they stand the test of time, have the 
potential of shedding important scientific light on this question. 
